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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of the estimatedprobability ofbank failure on the growth rates
oflarge time deposits and interest rates on those deposits. While riskier banks paid higher interest
rates, they attractedless largetime deposits in thesecond half of the 1980s. These results indicate
that risky banks faced unfavorable supply schedules oflarge time deposits and, hence, support the
presence of marketdiscipline by large time depositors. The empirical analysis also considers the
effects ofbank size, but fails to find evidence that depositors preferredlarge banks.
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The banking turmoil of the 1980s has raised concerns about the riskiness of
banks. Since government regulation has limitations and imposes costs both on
banks and regulators, banking authorities may more effectively discourage banks
from taking risks by subjecting them to increased market discipline by
debtholders. Depositors are the major debtholders of banks. Thus, it is an
important question if depositors can impose reliable market discipline on banks.
Many previous studies find that riskier banks offer higher interest rates
on their uninsured financial instruments.1 They interpret higher interest rates
offered by riskier banks as evidence of market discipline. Suppliers of
uninsured funds compel risky banks to compensate high risks with high interest
rates. To make the argument more convincing, however, we need to incorporate the
quantity of uninsured funds in the analysis. The riskiness of banks may
influence both the demand and supply of uninsured funds. To finance aggressive
expansion, risky banks may want to rely more heavily on uninsured funds that are
more sensitive to interest rates. Thus, higher interest rates may result from
a leftward shift of the supply curve, a rightward shift of the demand curve, or
both.
This paper studies the behavior of large time deposits ($100,000 or more)
in the second half of the 1980s when bank failure rates were high. The behavior
of the deposits that are not fully insured should reflect the depositors’ ability
to measure the failure risk of banks. The empirical study focuses on the effects
of the riskiness of banks on the growth of large time deposits and interest rates
‘Those studies include Crane (1976), Baer and Brewer (1986), James
(1987), Hannan and Hanweck (1988), and Cargill (1989). Avery et al. (1989),
on the other hand, fail to find a strong relationship between measures of bank
risk and interest rates on subordinated notes and debentures offered by banks.
1on those deposits. Bank size will also be considered to examine if the “too big
to fail” policy induced depositors to prefer large banks. I make cross-sectional
comparison, using the estimated probability of failure as a risk measure. The
estimated probability, which combines many risk measures, facilitates the
interpretation of results. As mentioned above, a complete analysis requires a
simultaneous equation model specifying demand and supply schedules. Due to the
difficulties of identifying the demand and supply schedules, however, this paper
infers the demand and supply effects from the coefficients of reduced form
equations.
The empirical findings support the presence of market discipline by large
time depositors. In general, riskier banks offered higher interest on large time
deposits but attracted less large time deposits during the period examined by
this study. Bank size does not appear to have significantly affected the
depositors’ selection of banks.
2. Estimation
The estimation involves two steps. In the first step, the probability of
bank failure is estimated based on financial statements and actual failure
records. The failure probability is probably the most relevant risk measure to
large depositors because banks fully pay off depositors as long as they remain
in business. In the second step, I examine how the estimated probability of
failure affected the growth rates of large time deposits and interest rates on
large time deposits.
2.a. Probability of failure
This section builds a failure prediction model to estimate the probability
of bank failure. Many previous studies look at the possibility of identifying
problem banks based on publicly available information and show that econometric
2models can predict bank failures with reasonable accuracy. Logistic regressions
have been used most frequently in those studies and have produced reasonable
results (e.g., Martin (1977), Avery and Hanweck (1984), Barth and others (1985),
and Thompson (1991)). This study also adopts a logistic regression. In recent
years, some authors adopted more sophisticated estimation techniques such as
proportional hazards model (Whalen, 1991), two-step logit (Thompson, 1992) and
split-population survival-time model (Cole and Gunther, forthcoming), but results
were similar.
The logistic regression is specified such that the estimated probability
best serves the purpose of the second-stage analysis, which is to examine the
growth rates and interest rates on large time deposits during year t (1985-1989).
The dependent variable is failure or nonfailure in year t+l, and explanatory
variables are financial characteristics derived from financial statements at the
end of year t-l. In year t, depositors have access to year-end financial
statements of year t-l. Thus, if depositors are able to process the available
information accurately, they may estimate failure probabilities similar to those
predicted by the model in year t. Although failure records in year t are also
relevant, banks that failed in year t are not considered because we cannot
calculate the growth rates and interest rates on large time deposits for those
banks.
This analysis employs the Call Report (Consolidated Reports of Condition
and Income) data. Unlike most other studies on failure predictions and market
discipline that use small subsets of banks, the data set covers the entire
population of FDIC-insured commercial banks with a few restrictions. I eliminate
the banks less than 5 years old as of the Call Report date. The financial
characteristics and growth pattern of relatively new banks may differ from those
3of established ones, and the differences may not stem from financial problems.
For example, new banks may show low income, but low income while cultivating the
customer base should not be viewed as a sign of financial trouble. I also
exclude the banks that were involved in mergers and acquisitions in year t or t+l
because mergers and acquisitions can significantly affect the growth rate of
large time deposits and the failure and survival of banks. In addition, banks
that failed within one year from the report date are eliminated for the reasons
mentioned above. In cases that many banks belonging to the same bank holding
company failed in the same year, only the largest banks in total assets were
included in the sample. The failures of smaller institutions can be caused by
the failure of the lead bank of a bank holding company, rather than by their own
financial problems.
The logistic regression adopts explanatory variables mostly among those
variables that have been found significant by previous studies. The independent
variables can be classified into the following six categories that include the
five components of the examiners’ CAMEL ratings.2
1. Capital adequacy
GAOl Equity / total assets
CAO2 = (loan loss reserves - loans 90 days or more past due - nonaccruing loans)
/ total assets
These two variables measure the adequacy of capital.3
2CAMEL stands for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings,
and liquidity. Examiners analyze the five components to evaluate the
financial strength of banks.
3Some earlier studies combine these two variables (eg,, Sinkey (1975) and
Thompson (1991)). Since delinquent loans may not result in a dollar for
dollar reduction in capital, the two variable may capture capital adequacy
more accurately when entered separately.
42. Asset quality
AQO1 = U.S. Treasury and agency securities (book value) / total assets






= Total loans / total assets
= Net chargeoffs / total loans
= Income earned but not collected / total assets
= Commercial and industrial loans / total loans
= Loans secured by construction and commercial real estate, multifamily
residential properties and farmland / total loans
The first three variables are the shares of broad asset categories of differing
risk. While U.S. Treasury securities are regarded as relatively safe assets,
loans are generally considered risky. Other real estates owned consist largely
of foreclosed real estates whose market values are generally lower than the book
values. The next four variables measure the quality of loan portfolios. AQO4
indicates collection problems, and AQO5 reflect both collection problems and
capital adequacy. Commercial and industrial loans and commercial real estate
loans are relatively risky loans.
3. Management risk
NRO1 = Overhead (expenses of premises and fixed assets) / total assets
MRO2 = Non-interest expenses / revenue
MRO3 = Loans to insiders / total assets
The first two variables concern operating efficiency, which may depend on
competence of managers. Loans to insiders can partly reflect the honesty of
managers.
4. Earnings
EAO1 = Net income after taxes / total assets
5Current profitability of a bank may be a good indicator of its future
performance.
5. Liquidity
LIO1 = (Cash + Securities + Federal funds sold) / total assets (LIO1)
Larger holdings of liquid assets may enable banks to manage financial problems
more flexibly.
6. Others
OTO1 = Core deposits (nontransactions accounts + money market deposit accounts
+ savings deposits) / total assets
OTO2 = Natural logarithm of total assets
OTO3 = Natural logarithm of total assets of the highest bank holding company
OTO4 = the growth rate of the average number of nonfarm payrolls in the state
where the bank is located between the year preceding the financial
statements and the year of the financial statements.
The first three variables intend to capture banks’ ability to raise capital. The
ratio of core deposits can be a proxy of banks’ charter value. Even if its book
value of capital is low, a bank with a large charter value should be able to
raise the needed capital to avoid failure. Larger banks, which are better known
in financial markets, may suffer less information asymmetry in rasing capital.
In addition, the failure probability can be lower for larger banks because of the
“too big to fail” policy. It is also possible that the size of holding companies
is more relevant than the size of individual banks. The strength of local
economies may affect the quality of existing loan portfolios and lending
opportunities in the future.
Table 1 presents the results of the logistic regressions that estimate the
probability of failure. The coefficients of most variables have expected signs,
6and all but one variable, AQO3 in 1987, with unexpected signs are statistically
insignificant. Both type 1 and type 2 errors (misclassification of failure as
nonfailure and misclassification of nonfailure as failure, respectively) at the
cutoff probability of 0.01 are mostly under 10 percent, indicating high
prediction accuracy.4 Thus, the regressions provide reliable estimates of
failure probability. If depositors are concerned about the risk of banks and
able to measure the risk, they may use similar probability estimates in selecting
banks. Thus, market discipline by depositors means significant effects of the
estimated probability on the depositors’ selection of banks.
2.b. Effects of failure probability on large time deposits
To accurately ascertain market discipline by depositors, we need to analyze
the behavior of large time deposits in a demand and supply framework that
incorporates both the price and quantity. A high failure probability of a bank
will make depositors reluctant to deposit in the bank. On the other hand, a bank
facing imminent failure may need more funds to turn around the situation by
taking risks aggressively. Then the bank may rely heavily on large time deposits
because they are relatively sensitive to interest rates.
Ideally, we need to specify a simultaneous equation model with demand and
supply equations. It is difficult, however, to identify demand and supply
equations due to the lack of exogenous variables that are significant. Thus,
this paper estimates the following reduced form equations.
IRATE = a0
+ a1~PROBA+ a2”MATUR + a3•SHARE
DEPST = b0
+ b,•PROBA + b2•MATUR + b3•SHARE
where INTER = the estimated average interest rate on large time deposits during
4The cutoff probability is set at 0.01 because it was about the average
failure rate in the second half of the l980s.
7year t (annual interest expenses on large time deposits divided
by the average amount of large time deposits outstanding during
year t).
DEPST = the growth rate of large time deposits during year t.
PROBA = the estimated probability of failure.
MATUR = the weighted average maturity of large time deposits.
SHARE = the ratio of large time deposits to total assets at the end of
year t.
The variables MATUR and SHARE are included to control for accounting
relationships. The maturity structure of deposits will affects the average
interest rate. The growth rate of large time deposits may relatively be low for
banks that are already heavy users of large time deposits.
The two equations above estimate the effects of the failure probability on
the equilibrium growth rate and interest rate, resulting from the interaction
between the banks’ demand and depositors’ supply of large time deposits. We can
better infer the extent of market discipline, the responsiveness of the supply
curve to the failure probability, by looking at both the equilibrium quantity and
price, than from the price alone. The following rules of thumb can be
constructed in interpreting the results. If the sign of PROBA is:
1. Positive in El and positive in E2 - the major effect is a rightward shift of
the demand curve.
2. Positive in El and negative in E2 - the major effect is a leftward shift of
the supply curve.
3. Negative in El and positive in E2 - the major effect is a rightward shift of
the supply curve.
4. Negative in El and negative in E2 - the major effect is a leftward shift of
8the demand curve.
The presence of market discipline is most convincingly supported in Case 2, least
likely in Case 3, and inconclusive in Cases 1 and 4.
The estimation of the above equations involve some data problems. The
estimated interest rates contain several outliers possibly due to reporting
errors (see Table 2). Growth rates commonly show some extreme values. The
outliers can seriously contaminate regression results. Furthermore, the
estimated probability is distributed heavily toward the left tail. The skewed
distribution of PROBA suggests that the relationship may not be linear. To
remedy these problems, I replace the raw data with their corresponding ranks.
With the rank transform, outliers do not significantly affect regression results.
In addition, the rank transform improves regression results when the dependent
variable is a monotonic but nonlinear function of independent variables (Iman and
Conover, 1979). A disadvantage with the rank transform is that the economic
significance of explanatory variables cannot be inferred from regression
coefficients. Regressions using raw data do not overcome this problem because
the magnitude of coefficients is not reliable when the sample contains many
outliers. Thus, it is sensible to use a method that estimates statistical
significance more accurately.
The regression results are reported in Table 3. The estimated probability
positively affected the interest rate in 1985 and 1986, meaning that riskier
banks offered higher interest rates on large time deposits in those years. In
the following three years, however, the coefficient of PROBA was statistically
insignificant. The second set of regressions shows that large time deposits grew
faster at banks with low failure probabilities in the all five years examined by
this study. A combination of lower equilibrium quantity and the same or high
9equilibrium price requires a leftward shift of the supply curve. Thus, these
results indicate that risky banks faced unfavorable supply schedules of large
time deposits and, hence, the presence of market discipline.
2.c. Size of banks
Bank size may also affect the supply of large time deposits. Since the
failure of a large banks can disturb the entire banking system, the government
is more likely to bail out large banks (“too big to fail” policy). The
possibility of government bailouts may make depositors perceive smaller failure
probabilities for larger banks. If this is the case, large banks face favorable
supply schedules. Then assuming that demand schedules are same across banks of
different size, larger banks may enjoy a lower equilibrium price and a higher
equilibrium quantity.
Table 4 presents the results of regressions that include banks size
(BSIZE), the rank of total assets, as an additional explanatory variable. If
depositors perceive that larger banks are safer than the failure probabilities
calculated based on actual failure records, BSIZE should have a negative effect
on IRATE and a positive effect on DEPST. The estimation shows positive effects
of BSIZE both on IRATE and DEPST in 1985 and 1986. The signs of BSIZE reversed
in the following three years.5 In other words, large banks attracted less large
time deposits when they offered lower interest rates and more large time deposits
when they offered higher interest rates. These results, thus, do not tell much
about the effects of bank size on the supply of large time deposits. It appears
that large banks differed from small banks in their funding needs, rather than
in supply conditions. The regression results suggest that large banks demanded
5The results are similar when the size of bank holding companies, instead
of banks, is used as an explanatory variable.
10less large time deposits in 1985 and 1986 and more large time deposits between
1987 and 1989.
The regression estimating the failure probability includes the size of
banks and bank holding companies (OTO2 and OTO3). Then a possible reason for the
failure to find the relationship between bank size and the supply of large time
deposits is that the estimated probability of failure already incorporates the
effects of the too big to fail policy. To test this possibility, I use failure
probabilities (PROBB) estimated by logistic regressions excluding OTO3 and OTO4.
When the two variables are excludes, prediction accuracy is slightly lower, but
qualitative results are roughly the same.
Table 5 reports the results of the regressions that use the new estimate
of failure probabilities (PROBB). The new regressions do not suggest significant
effects of banks size on the supply of large time deposits either. Large banks
attracted more large time deposits only when they offered higher interest rates.
Another possibility is that the effects of the too big to fail policy may
be confined to a small number of banks. In this case, the large sample used by
this study may bury the effects of bank size. To test this possibility, I
examine the residuals of the regressions presented in Table 5 for large banks.
If only a few large banks enjoyed favorable supply schedules, those banks on
average may have paid lower interest rates and attracted more deposits than
predicted by the regressions. Then the average residuals should be negative in
the regression with the dependent variable IRATE and positive in the regression
with the dependent variable DEPST. The average residuals for large banks,
however, do not show consistent patterns (Table 6). Thus, this paper fails to
support that large banks enjoyed favorable supply schedules due to the too big
to fail policy. These analyses, of course, do not reject the effect of bank size
11on the supply of large time deposits. The estimation of the reduced form
equations simply indicates that the demand effect was dominant.6
3. Conclusion
This paper has examined how the riskiness of banks affected the depositors
supply and banks’ demand for large time deposits in the second half of the l98Os.
While riskier banks generally paid higher interest rates on large time deposits,
they attracted less large time deposits. These results indicate that the high
interest rates paid by risky banks resulted from leftward shifts of the supply
schedule rather than rightward shifts of the demand schedule of large time
deposits. Thus, this paper more convincingly supports the presence of market
discipline by depositors than previous studies looking only at the interest
rates.
The examination of the effects of bank size fails to support that
depositors preferred large banks because of the too big to fail policy. Large
banks attracted more large time deposits only when they offered high interest
rates. Thus, it appears that the relationship between bank size and interest
rates largely reflects the funding need of large banks, rather than depositors’
preference.
In sum, large time depositors forced risky banks to pay risk premiums, and
the risk premiums were not significantly affected by the too big to fail policy
in the second half of the l98Os. Thus, market discipline by depositors
contributed to restraining banks from taking risks during the period.
6It is also possible that the estimate of interest rates introduces a
systematic bias with respect to bank size. The uninsured portion of large
time deposits increases with the average denomination of large time deposits,
which may be positively correlated with bank size. Then the average interest
rates on large time deposits may be higher for larger banks even if they are
perceived safer.
12Table 1: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Failure or Nonfailure
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
INTCT -8.744 8.362* 3.622 8.489** 5.687
(6.5) (4.5) (4.6) (3.2) (5.1)
GAOl ~29.989** ~36.679** ~40.782** ~36.ll5** ~53.3l7**
(7.0) (6.2) (6.3) (6.3) (6.5)
CAO2 _12.769** ~l6.323** ~l2.67l** ~lO.552* ~l8.438**
(4.3) (3.5) (4.3) (5.0) (4.9)
AQO1 2.115 -0.064 1.163 ~4.lO4* ~5.85l**
(2.0) (1.6) (1.9) (1.9) (1.8)
AQO2 11.355 9.430 11.337 9.726 6.998
(9.1) (6.7) (6.7) (5.2) (6.7)
AQO3 7.914 -4.639 1.857 _8.978** -6.839
(6.0) (4.0) (4.2) (2.8) (4.6)
AQO4 6.548 4.940 -9.979 6.082** 12.183*
(6.5) (5.2) (6.4) (1.6) (5.6)
AQO5 96.532** 72.256** 29.268 68.000** 63.000*
(14.8) (14.6) (22.4) (24.9) (26.9)
AQO6 3.l77** 3.5l4** 2.926** 4.l49** 0.066
(0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (1.0) (1.1)
AQO7 2.209* 1.244 1.389 3.663** 3.44O**
(1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.2) (1.0)
MRO1 -28.456 59.O02** 35.551 4.899 97.181*
(52.1) (15.9) (44.0) (41.4) (42.8)
NRO2 3.020 0.140 0.444 0.175 0.189
(2.3) (1.6) (1.6) (0.1) (1.7)
MRO3 7.854* 4.425 1.568 4.191 l3.877**
(3.8) (2.6) (6.1) (7.0) (4.6)
EAO1 -7.506 1.658 ~l9.749* ~l4.722* 0.641
(11.4) (8.5) (9.4) (6.7) (9.9)
LIO1 -0.352 ~l0.l35* ~3.454 ~lO.482** -4.870
(6.1) (4.1) (4.2) (3.0) (4.7)
OTO1 ~5.295** ~4.7O6** ~3.502** ~4.4O6** ~2.932*
(1.4) (1.2) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2)OTO2 O.676** 0.383 -0.089 0.604 1.005*
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
OTO3 ~0.677** ~O.786** _0.46l** ~O.78l** _O.982**
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4)
OTO4 -7.812 ~22.28l** ~29.625** ~38.63l** 57652**
(7.4) (6.2) (5.3) (6.2) (18.4)
-2 Log L 715.0 845.0 610.7 479.9 549.5
Type 1
Error 9.6% 9.5% 10.9% 3.6% 2.1%
Type 2
Error 12.1% 14.7% 9.8% 7.5% 8.6%
Number of
Obs. 11,823 11,336 10,717 10,504 10,377
Numbers in the parenthesis are standard errors.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
IRATE Mean 0.08725 0.07355 0.06493 0.07029 0.08219
Median 0.08644 0.07278 0.06500 0.07073 0.08299
S.D. 0.01924 0.01635 0.01374 0.01264 0.01408
Max 0.39779 0.48500 0.43220 0.21259 0.32526
Mm 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00593 0.00000
DEPOT Mean 0.24128 0.32501 0.28246 0.30008 0.23992
Median 0.06283 -0.00104 0.06815 0.12983 0.09571
S.D. 1.02971 18.94128 3.18627 1.01410 0.86226
Max 30.48 1976.90 307.95 48.15 42.25
Mm -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000
PROBA Mean 0.00795 0.01112 0.00858 0.00790 0.00935
Median 0.00100 0.00121 0.00079 0.00029 0.00059
S.D. 0.03559 0.04863 0.04427 0.04776 0.05518
Max 0.91040 0.97841 0.98377 0.99678 0.99914
Mm l.9E-lO l.SE-lO 3.3E-l5 l.2E-l3 7.7E-26Table 3: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: IRATE
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
INTCT 4,514 3,300 3,388 3,851 4,840
































R-Square 0.0498 0.1086 0.0990 0.0531 0.0259
Number of
Obs. 11,232 10,801 10,187 10,061 10,036
Dependent Variable: DEPST
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
INTCT 7,256 6,448 6,855 6,777 6,500
































R-Square 0.0597 0.0458 0.0791 0.1056 0.0902
Number of
Obs. 11,232 10,801 10,187 10,061 10,036
Numbers in the parenthesis are t-ratios.Table 4: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: IRATE
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
INTCT 4,838 3,631 2,925 3,145 4,021










































R-Square 0.0534 0.1110 0.1035 0.0720 0.0591
Number of
Obs. 11,232 10,801 10,187 10,061 10,036
Dependent Variable: DEPST
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
INTCT 7,334 6,599 6,344 6,407 6,220










































R-Square 0.0600 0.0466 0.0879 0.1134 0.0958
Number of
Obs. 11,232 10,801 10,187 10,061 10,036
Numbers in the parenthesis are t-ratios.Table 5: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: IRATE
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
INTCT 4,873 3,799 2,956 3,048 3,821










































R-Square 0.0532 0.1096 0.1038 0.0741 0.0627
Number of
Obs. 11,232 10,801 10,187 10,061 10,036
Dependent Variable: DEPST
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
INTCT 7,385 6,512 6,243 6,314 6,267










































R-Square 0.0642 0.0506 0.0888 0.1117 0.0984
Number of
Obs. 11,232 10,801 10,187 10,061 10,036
Numbers in the parenthesis are t-ratios.Table 6: Average Residuals for Large Banks
Group Dependent 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Variable
10 Largest IRATE 103.2 -309.2 2175.3 2145.3 833.6
DEPST -1147.9 -348.4 -367.1 -850.2 -1243.9
20 Largest IRATE -697.8 -299.6 1591.4 1778.6 773.9
DEPST -406.1 900.5 661.8 -336.3 -333.5
50 Largest IRATE -840.7 -504.7 1072.4 1334.1 669.0
DEPST -60.4 752.7 963.8 -2.9 110.1
100 Largest IRATE -477.4 -388.6 1035.8 1636.1 1065.4
DEPST 70.4 889.0 804.6 327.0 -203.2References
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